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INTRODUCTION 
In the spirit of give and take one may expect to be tolerant of some interference with 
the use and enjoyment of one's home by neighbouring occupiers of land. However, it 
is when that interference is unreasonable and substantial that one might expect to be 
able to take legal recourse, including civil action. However, which form or forms of 
civil action might be suitable for the task? Negligence is not suitable if the harm 
suffered is purely to one's use and enjoyment of the home: such as loss of sleep through 
noise, or loss of enjoyment as a result of a noxious smell.1 Intentional torts such as 
trespass to the person or harassment will obviously only be effective where the 
interference is direct. One may obtain the protection of an injunction if the Attorney 
General successfully brings a criminal case in public nuisance. However, this will 
require that a class of people is affected2 and furthermore it is only possible to obtain 
the tortious protection necessary to claim damages if one has suffered damage greater 
than ordinary sufferers have.3 This leaves private nuisance. 
In Malone v. Laskey,4 private nuisance was seen as merely protecting rights over 
land. This view was supported in Professor Newark's seminal article, The Boundaries 
of Nuisance.5 However, in Khorasandijan v. Bush,6 the Court of Appeal by a two to one 
majority (Dillon and Rose L.J.J.; Peter Gibson J. dissenting) concluded that anyone 
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who occupied a property as a home could sue in nuisance for loss of use or enjoyment 
of that home. Di l lon L . J . stated that to his mind it was: 
ridiculous if in this present age the law is that the making of deliberately harassing and 
pestering telephone calls to a person is only actionable in the civil courts if the recipient 
of the calls happens to have the freehold or leasehold proprietary interest in the premises 
in which he or she has received the calls.7 
The issue was raised again in Hunter v. Canary Wharf and Hunter v. Docklands 
Development Corporation8. A differently constituted Court of Appeal9 unanimously 
favoured Khorasandijan over Malone. Giving the sole opinion, Pill L . J . stated that: 
[a] substantial link between the person enjoying the use and the land on which he or she 
is enjoying it is essential but, in my judgment, occupation of property, as a home, does 
confer upon the occupant a capacity to sue in private nuisance. 
There has been a trend in the law to give additional protection to occupiers in some 
circumstances. Given that trend and the basis of the law of nuisance in this context, it is 
no longer tenable to limit the sufficiency of that link by reference to proprietary or 
possessory interests in land. I regard satisfying the test of occupation of property as a 
home provides a sufficient link with the property to enable the occupier to sue in private 
nuisance. It is an application in present-day conditions of the essential character of the test 
as contemplated by Lord Wright. It appears to me, as it did to Dillon L.J . to be right in 
principle and to avoid inconsistencies, for example between members of a family, which in 
this context cannot now be justified.10 
However, when the case came to the House of Lords, by way of appeal by the 
plaintiffs with a cross appeal by the defendants, a four to one majority (Lords Goff, 
Lloyd, Hoffman, Cooke and Hope with Lord Cooke dissenting on this point) favoured 
the orthodox approach in Malone. 
There are three important points to make about this approach to nuisance. First, it 
will probably also apply to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher11 since this rule has been 
shown by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co v. Eastern Counties Leather 
Pic.I2 to be a branch of the law of nuisance dealing with instances of isolated escape.13 
Second, it means one must have rights over land - such as exclusive possession of the 
land,14 ownership without exclusive possession or a reversionary interest-in order to 
sue. Third, it follows that the objective of the court in providing remedies is purely to 
protect rights over the land. The only benefit for people who merely occupy the land 
as a home, whether as a lodger, au pair, live in carer or family member is if the person 
with rights over the land is be successful in obtaining abatement of the nuisance. 
Although Hunter has been widely criticised, little academic attention has been 
directed towards challenging its legacy of inadequate legal protection of home life, 
particularly in the context of those without proprietary interests in land. Human rights 
law holds the key. "Victims" of the Hunter approach could claim before the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that, by failing to provide adequate domestic law, 
the U K had violated one of their substantive convention rights (the Article 8 right to 
7
 Ibid, at 734. 
8
 [1997] A . C . 655. 
9
 Pill L . J . , Waite L . J . and Neill L . J . 
10
 Ibid, at 675. 
" [1868] L .R. 3 H . L . 330, H . L . 
12
 [1994] 2 A . C . 264. 
13
 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, 18th edition para 2014) suggest this point is "at least arguable". 
14
 A tolerated trespasser with exclusive possession can sue - see Pemberton v. Southwark London Borough Council [2000] 3 
Al l E.R. 924, C .A. 
Improving Protection Against Indirect Interference 3 
private life being the most obvious) and denied them an effective remedy under Article 
13. Success would "force" the U K Parliament to take remedial legislative action. 
Alternatively, following the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 ( H R A ) 
claimants could argue before the domestic courts in a suitable case that domestic law 
must be expanded in the light of Convention rights. 
O f course one would expect the human rights law arguments to involve a different 
kind of reasoning to that used by the House of Lords in Hunter. Nonetheless, it is 
important to revisit the justifications put forward by the House for adopting the 
narrower approach in Malone since these arguments are likely to be relied on by the 
defendant to such a human rights law claim. 
T H E J U S T I F I C A T I O N S P U T F O R W A R D I N HUNTER 
The defendants in Hunter argued15 that Khorasandijan should be seen as wrongly 
decided because it was based on the Canadian decision in Motherwell v. Motherwell16 
which had in turn wrongly supported the proposition, derived from Foster v. 
Warblington Urban Council,11 that occupancy of a substantial nature was necessary to 
establish standing to sue in private nuisance. Alternatively they suggested that 
Khorasandijan should be seen as opening up a new tort of harassment, leaving the 
Malone orthodoxy intact.18 Lord Goff,19 supported by Lords Lloyd, 2 0 Hoffman21 and 
Hope2 2 all accepted the first of these arguments as a ground to deny the existence of 
a right of action. They took the view that the plaintiff in Foster had succeeded because 
he had exclusive possession and that the court had not established that occupant-
licensees without exclusive possession could sue. Lord Goff added that he thought that 
what the Court of Appeal in Khorsandijan had been doing was to attempt to exploit 
the law of private nuisance in order to create a separate tort of harassment "that was 
artificially limited to harassment" which took place in the plaintiffs home.23 He noted 
that he did not personally think: 
that this is a satisfactory manner in which to develop the law, especially when, as in the 
case in question, the step so taken was inconsistent with another decision in the Court of 
Appeal, viz., Malone v. Laskey [1907] 2 K.B. 141 by which the court was bound. In any 
event, a tort of harassment has now received statutory recognition . . . We are therefore no 
longer troubled with the question whether the common law should be developed to provide 
such a remedy. For these reasons, I do not consider that any assistance can be derived 
from Khorasandijan v. Bush by the plaintiff in the present appeals.24 
The statutory recognition of harassment may remove the problem of seeking to 
develop the common law to provide a remedy for harassment in the home context. 
However, the comment by Dil lon L . J . in Khorasandijan that it would be "ridiculous" 
15
 [1997] A .C . 655 at 677. 
16
 (1976) 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62. 
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 [1906] 1 K.B. 648. 
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 [1997] A .C . 655 at 678. 
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20
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 Ibid, at 702-3. 
22
 Ibid, at 724. 
23
 Ibid, at 692. 
24
 Ibid. For positive reception of the idea of a tort of harassment stemming from Khorasandijan see Conaghan, "Harassment 
and the Law of Torts" (1993) 1 Feminist Legal Studies 189. 
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if today's law would only protect freeholders and leaseholders from deliberate 
harassment at home25 when it could equally apply to many non-harassing interferences 
bears further consideration. Hence, even putting human rights law aside, there is a need 
to consider whether the majority had adequate justification to take the approach they 
did. 
Lord Goff found two substantive arguments in favour of retaining the rights over 
land approach. The first was that it enabled, where appropriate, those creating a 
nuisance to make an informal arrangement with the "rightholder(s)": 
either that it may continue for a certain period of time, possibly on the payment of a sum 
of money, or that it shall cease, again perhaps on certain terms including the time within 
which the cessation shall take place. The former may well occur when an agreement is 
reached between neighbours about the circumstances in which one of them may carry out 
major repairs to his house which may affect the other's enjoyment of his property . . .26 
His Lordship suggested that: 
. . . the efficacy of arrangements such as these depends on the existence of an identifiable 
person with whom the creator of the nuisance can deal for this purpose. If anybody who 
lived in the relevant property as a home had the right to sue, sensible arrangements such 
as these might in some cases no longer be practicable.27 
It is suggested that this problem is unlikely to be serious as households of any size 
could always nominate one or more of their number to negotiate an arrangement on 
their behalf. 
The second basis on which Lord Goff supported the orthodox position was that the 
alternative: 
faces the problem of defining the category of persons who have the right to sue. The Court 
of Appeal adopted the not easily identifiable category of those who have a "substantial 
link" with the land, regarding a person who occupied the premises "as a home" as having 
a sufficient link for this purpose. But who is to be included in this category? It was plainly 
intended to include husbands and wives, or partners, and their children, and even other 
relatives living with them. But is the category also to include the lodger upstairs, or the 
au pair girl or resident nurse caring for an invalid who makes her home in the house while 
she works there? If the latter, it seems strange that the category should not extend to 
include places where people work as well as well as places where they live, where nuisances 
such as noise can be just as unpleasant or distracting. In any event, the extension of the 
tort in this way would transform it from a tort to land into a tort to the person, in which 
damages could be recovered in respect of something less serious than personal injury and 
the criteria for liability were founded not upon negligence but upon striking a balance 
between the interests of neighbours in the use of their land. This is, in my opinion, not an 
acceptable way in which to develop the law.28 
With respect to Lord Goff, changing the law to allow residents in general a right of 
action would not have a significant impact on certainty. This class of persons is fairly 
clear. It would include not just family members but also lodgers and those who work 
and live in the home (such as the au pair and live-in carer) but exclude people who are 
temporary visitors, such as hotel guests or visiting friends and relatives. His Lordship's 
concern about where it would all end if we went down this route was, it is submitted, 
[1993] Q.B. 727 at 734. 
[1997] A .C . 655-727 at 692. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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a rather crude attempt to justify the orthodox position by reference to worries about 
a slippery slope when that slippery slope does not exist. In academic commentary, 
Wightman has perhaps gone the furthest by suggesting that rights of action should 
extend to protecting those who have an important "activity connection" with the land 
without having rights over it: such as people engaged in recreational activities or 
enjoying a right of way.29 However, it would be equally be logical to stop short of this 
and simply protect occupation of the home, an approach that Lord Cooke in his 
dissenting speech thought was, ". . . an acceptable criterion, consistent with the 
traditional concern for the sanctity of family life and the Englishman's home."30 Even 
one of the majority, Lord Lloyd, had some sympathy with this view31 though he 
rejected the suggested change on the basis that it would fundamentally change the 
scope of private nuisance as a cause of action: 
Like, I imagine, all your Lordships, I would be in favour of modernising the law wherever 
this can be done. But it is one thing to modernise the law by ridding it of unnecessary 
technicalities; it is another thing to bring about a fundamental change in the nature and 
scope of a cause of action.32 
Both Lord Lloyd and Lord Hoffman took the view that the three kinds of private 
nuisance (nuisance by encroachment on a neighbour's land; nuisance by direct physical 
injury to a neighbour's land; and nuisance by interference with a neighbour's quiet 
enjoyment of his or her land) should be subject to an award of damages in the same 
measure, that is, diminution in the value of the land. As Lord Lloyd put it: 
there is no difference of principle. The effect of smoke from a neighbouring factory is to 
reduce the value of the land. There may be no diminution in the market value. But there 
will certainly be loss of amenity value so long as the nuisance lasts.33 
The significance of using this approach is that adding family members would make 
no difference to the value of the claim. As Lord Lloyd again put it, "[i]f that be the 
right approach, then the reduction in amenity value is the same whether the land is 
occupied by the family man or the bachelor."34 
In effect one is compensated not for the number of people affected or the degree to 
which they are affected but the degree to which the value of the land or one's ability 
to use the land is reduced. As Lord Hoffman states, inconvenience, annoyance and 
illness could not be compensated as consequential losses in a private nuisance claim: 
"[i]t is rather the other way about: the injury to the amenity of the land consists in the 
fact that the persons upon it are liable to suffer inconvenience, annoyance or illness."35 
It follows therefore, in the words of Lord Lloyd, "that the only persons entitled to sue 
for loss in amenity value of the land are the owner or the occupier with the right of 
exclusive possession".36 
One may concede this point. However, Lord Hoffman states that having done so 
"there seems no logic in compromise limitations, such as that proposed by the Court 
29
 J . Wightman, "Nuisance - the Environmental Tort? Hunter v. Canary Wharf in the House of Lords" (1998) 61 M . L . R . 
871-885 at 881. 
30
 [1997] A . C . 665-727 at 718. 
31
 Ibid, at 695. 
32
 Ibid, at 696. 
33




 Ibid, at 706. 
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of Appeal in this case, requiring the plaintiff to have been residing on land as his or 
her home."37 The problem with this view is that: 
[t]he traditional division of the law into 'torts' is, at most, of expository value. To allow 
the preservation of the supposed conceptual integrity of this structure to influence the law's 
approach to social problems is to allow the tail to wag the dog.38 
The change that Lord Hoffman found illogical had in fact the logic of doing justice; 
a logic that the House of Lords had readily used in the past as a basis for abandoning 
established rules and principles.39 What is more, their Lordships could have satisfied 
both forms of logic by creating a new tort. Counsel40 for the defendants had 
unwittingly hinted at this by suggesting that the plaintiff in Khorasandijan "would have 
been provided with a suitable remedy if English law recognised a tort of invasion of 
privacy".41 So, too, had Lord Lloyd in suggesting that Motherwell could be supported 
on the ground that in Canadian law there was already a recognised cause of action for 
invasion of privacy.42 
I N T R O D U C I N G A H U M A N R I G H T S L A W A N A L Y S I S 
Lord Cooke's dissenting speech drew persuasive support from human rights arguments. 
These included the rights of the child, under Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, to protection from interference in his or her home life and also the right, 
under Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights ( E C H R ) , of protection of the home life of 
people in general. The latter is of particular importance because the claimants in 
Hunter could have gone on to rely on it, along with Articles 13 and 14, had they 
applied to the E C t H R . 
Article 8 
Article 8(1) states 
everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
Article 8(2) defines the limits of protection of this right, stating 
there shall be no interference by a public authority with this right except such as in 
accordance with the law and as necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of crime and disorder, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Showing a violation of Article 8 is a two-part process. First, the claimant must show 
that the Article 8(1) right has been interfered with. Second, the claimant must 
37
 Ibid, at 707. 
38
 P. Cane, "What a Nuisance!" (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 515, at p. 520. 
39
 For example, in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd (No. 1) [1976] A .C . 443, [1975] 3 Al l E.R. H .L . it removed 
the rule that a plaintiff was not in law entitled to judgment for a sum of money expressed in a foreign currency. In R 
v. RfRape: Marital Exemption) [1991] 4 Al l E.R. 481, H .L . it even allowed retrospective criminalisation by abandoning 
the principle that a husband could not be guilty of the offence of rape against his wife. 
40
 Counsel included Lord Irvine of Lairg Q.C. (now L.C.). 
41
 [1997] A .C . 655-727 at 678. 
42
 Ibid, at 697-698. 
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show that the restriction on him or her caused by the interference cannot be justi-
fied as necessary in a democratic society to protect one of the interests laid down in 
Article 8(2). 
The scope of the term "home" 
The private and family life, home and correspondence aspects of Article 8(1) are often 
interwoven but have independent meanings and give rise to different lines of case law. 
The notion of "home" under Article 8 does not provide a constraint on the overall 
scope of the Article. In other words, though an interference may not take place in the 
home context it may nonetheless raise issues of private life. The point is made 
particularly effectively in Niemietz v. Germany (A/215B)43 where the E C t H R held that 
a lawyer's private life had been interfered with when his office was searched by police.44 
However, by the same token, there are cases where the state's conduct only constitutes 
an interference with private life because it related to events that took place within the 
home rather than outside it.45 
T o attract protection, one's home life does not need to revolve around a 
conventional house. One could, for example, dwell in a caravan, as did the applicants 
in Buckley v. United Kingdom46. However, this does not go as far as saying one would 
succeed in arguing that the whole of a vast area of land on which one lived a nomadic 
lifestyle would necessarily be a home for Article 8(1) purposes.47 Nor , rather 
restrictively, would a structure the claimant was building but had not yet lived in be 
classified as his or her home. Hence in Loizidou v. Turkey,4* where the applicant had 
begun building a block of flats on her plot of land in Northern Cyprus, one of which 
was intended to be a home for her and her family, but was prevented from completing 
by the invasion of Turkish forces, the E C t H R held that there was no interference with 
Article 8(1) because: 
. . . the applicant did not have her home on the land in question. In [the court's] opinion 
it would strain the meaning of the notion "home" in Article 8 to extend it to comprise 
property on which it is planned to build a house for residential purposes. Nor can that 
term be interpreted to cover an area of a State where one has grown up and where the 
family has its roots but where one no longer lives.49 
A l l of the cases in which applicants have been successful have involved their living 
for some time in the home concerned. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
one has to be living in it at the time of the application. In Gillow v. UK,50 the applicant 
had a house but had not lived in it for many years at the time of the application, 
(1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 97, ECtHR. 
The word "home" itself is given a broad meaning in some jurisdictions as paragraph 30 of the judgment itself emphasises: 
"[a]s regards the word 'home,' appearing in the English text of Article 8, the Court observes that in certain Contracting 
States, notably Germany..., it has been accepted as extending to business premises. Such an interpretation is, 
moreover, fully consonant with the French text, since the word 'domicile' has a broader connotation that the word 
'home' and may extend, for example, to a professional person's office." 
This is particularly the case where the events are of a sexual nature-see, for example, ADTv. UK [2000] 2 F .L .R . 697, 
(2001) 32 E.H.R.R. 33 and contrast it with Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. UK (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 39. 
(1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 101, ECtHR 
The Commission in G and E v. Norway, unreported, Nos. 9278/81 and 9415/81. 35 D and R 30 (October 1983) found 
that there was no interference with home life when a Lapp population was displaced from its indigenous lands (which 
were then submerged for the building of a hydro-electric plant). The plant went ahead despite extensive protests, which 
were encapsulated within Norway's widely aired 1983 Eurovision Song Contest entry. 
(1996) 23 E.H.R.R. 513 
Para 66. Fortunately the applicant's claim under Article 1 of Protocol 1 succeeded. 
(1986) 11 E.H.R.R. 335. 
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having let it. However, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8(1) with emphasis 
being placed on the fact that the applicant had maintained strong links with the house, 
had always intended to return to it and had left furnishings in it. 
As Loizidou shows, having legal rights over the land is no guarantee of success. 
However, equally, there are a number of reasons why one would expect to succeed 
in some cases without having such rights. First, the ECtHR has not made a point 
of stressing that rights over land are necessary. On occasion, judgments in favour of 
applicants do not even make it clear whether all the applicants have had rights 
over land.51 Second, when the applicant has rights over land the ECtHR does not 
restrict itself to awarding compensation for infringement of these rights.52 Third, it 
would be inconsistent with the common sense meaning of a "human right" to "home 
life" to say that a place is only a person's home if he or she has legal rights over 
it. 
Does the applicant have to suffer a certain level of adverse impact in order to establish 
an interference with Article 8(1)? 
Establishing an interference with Article 8(1) appears only to require that the complaint 
is sufficiently connected with the rights to home, privacy, family or correspondence and 
that an adverse impact on one of these rights has been experienced. There is no 
suggestion that it requires the applicant to show a particular degree of adverse effect. 
The ECtHR would be unlikely to impose such a requirement, as to do so would result 
in the approach to Article 8 failing to be consistent with that taken to the similarly 
structured Article 10.53 
However, there is a possibility that some claims involving very limited adverse 
impact may not reach the court in the first place. More than half of the applications 
to the ECtHR are declared inadmissible. Most of them are rejected under Article 35(3) 
as manifestly ill-founded. A declaration of inadmissibility on this ground would be 
made if the complaint disclosed gave no grounds to suggest that a violation were 
possible.54 This would be the case, for example, where it was inconsistent with a 
constant line of reasoning in the case law. In our scenario (that of a potential claimant 
with limited or no proprietary rights in the land relied on as his or her "home") an 
application involving an interference with Article 8(1) might be dismissed if, given a 
consistent line of reasoning in the case law, it was clear that the state involved 
could provide a justification under Article 8(2). Al l other things being equal, this 
is more likely to be so where the applicant had suffered only a minor adverse 
impact. 
51
 See, for example, Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 1 and also Guerra v. Italy (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 
357 where it is merely stated that the applicants lived in the area affected. 
52
 For example, the applicant in Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994) 20 E.H.R.R. 277 was compensated not just for the harm fumes 
and smells from a factory had caused to the market and amenity value of her land but also for the anxiety she had 
suffered as a result of her daughter's being caused a serious illness by the interference (para 298). Although the ECtHR 
deemed the grand total of her claim to be excessive it did not question any of the heads of her claim (para 299-300). 
53
 Under Article 10(1) there is no requirement of a level of adverse effect on freedom of expression for an interference to 
be founded. The rationale for this is that control on the type of applications that are successful can be exercised under 
Article 10(2) where the right of expression can be subject to such "formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society" to protect one (or more) of the interests laid down in Article 
10(2). Article 8(2) fulfils the same function of control in relation to Article 8(l)(per T. Lewis, Department of Academic 
Legal Studies, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, 18 April 2002, e-mail communication). 
54
 De Becker v. Belgium, Yearbook II (1958-9) p.214 (254). Since Article 35(3) is often the make or break issue in 
determining whether a case comes before the ECtHR the scope it is given is crucial yet the case law relating to it does 
not reveal an entirely consistent approach (see further P. van Dijk, and G. J. H . van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Kluwer 1990), p!04-107. 
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How far does the state have a duty to take positive measures to protect people from 
interferences by other people? 
The Article 8(1) right has a negative aspect in as much as it is designed to protect 
individuals from invasion of their rights by the state itself. It also has a positive aspect 
whereby the state is required to take appropriate positive measures to protect people 
from interference by other people. As the E C t H R put it in Powell and Rayner v. UK:55 
Article 8(1) cannot be interpreted so as to apply only with regard to direct measures taken 
by the authorities against the privacy and/or home of an individual. It may also cover 
indirect intrusions which are unavoidable consequences of measures not at all directed 
against private individuals. In this context it has to be noted that a State has not only to 
respect but also to protect the rights guaranteed by Article 8(1). 
The state may be held responsible for interferences it does not actively perpetrate 
where the interference was facilitated by failure of the state authorities to provide 
adequate assistance or protection. More relevantly, in the context of the scenario 
outlined above, it may be held responsible for an interference that stems from a failure 
to have adequate law. Hence, in Marckx v. Belguim56 and Johnston v. Ireland,57 the 
E C t H R held that the state was in violation of Article 8 by failing to provide a law 
allowing for inheritance by children born outside marriage. Cases where inadequacies 
in law resulted in the state failing to meet a positive obligation to avoid indirect 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the home include the factory pollution case 
of Lopez Ostra v. Spain5* and the Heathrow airport flight noise cases of Powell and 
Rayner v. UK59 and Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom.60 
Is the UK satisfying its positive obligation under Article 8(1) in this context? 
It was stressed in Stubbings and Others v. United Kingdom61 that 
Article 8 does not necessarily require that States fulfil their positive obligations to secure 
respect for private life by the provision of unlimited civil remedies in circumstances where 
criminal law sanctions are in operation.62 
However, this judgment was given in the context of U K law providing a civil remedy 
but subjecting it to a time bar63 whereas in the scenario outlined above those without 
rights over land do not have a civil remedy that adequately protects their use and 
enjoyment of home life from indirect interference in the first place. This would almost 
certainly to be considered a failure by the U K to satisfy its positive obligation to secure 
respect for Article 8. 
The nature of Article 8(2) 
A violation of Article 8 is avoided i f under Article 8(2) the restriction on the applicant's 
Article 8(1) rights can, in the circumstances, be justified as necessary in a democratic 
society. To satisfy this requirement the interference must be in accordance with law; 
55
 (1989) 9 E.H.R.R. 375 at 376. 
56
 (1979-1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 330. 
57
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pursue one of the legitimate aims laid down in Article 8(2) and meet a '"pressing social 
need".64 Furthermore its restrictive effects must be proportionate to the objective(s) 
that it seeks to achieve.65 
The state successfully justified indirect interference with the use and enjoyment of the 
home in the Heathrow Airport noise interference case of Powell and Rayner v. UK.66 
Here, the ECtHR afforded the U K a wide margin of appreciation to decide how best 
to address the problems of aircraft noise, holding that the taking of noise limitation 
measures and the public utility of the airport meant that the interference was justified 
under Article 8(2).67 However, in Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom6* a five to two 
majority of the ECtHR found the U K to have violated Article 8 in the context of sleep 
disturbance arising from Heathrow Airport night flights. The U K could show night 
flights pursued a legitimate economic objective but could not discharge its burden to 
show proportionality between its legitimate economic objective and the effect pursuit of 
this objective had on the Article 8(1) right and hence could not show that the 
restrictions were necessary in a democratic society. The reason for this was that it could 
not quantify either the economic benefit of the night flights or the adverse effect such 
flights had by preventing some of the population from getting a full night of sleep.69 
Hatton may not contradict the reasoning used in Powell but certainly represents an 
evolution in Article 8 protection through placement of "the onus on the State to justify 
a situation where certain individuals are bearing a heavy burden on behalf of the rest 
of the community".70 
Is the interference in this context justifiable as necessary under Article 8(2)? 
In the scenario outlined above, interference with Article 8(1) would, it is suggested, be 
in accordance with the law. However, would such interference amount to the pursuit 
of a legitimate aim or the meeting of a pressing social need? Further, would the 
interference satisfy the requirement of proportionality? The answer can be found by 
analysing the justifications used by the court to support its position in Hunter. These 
can be summarised as follows: 
(1) the need to follow precedent; 
(2) the linked need for private nuisance not to be distorted so as to become a 
remedy it was not originally designed to be; 
(3) the benefits of simplifying (and consequently encouraging) informal arrange-
ments between neighbours by limiting title to sue (combined with the argument 
that this often suffices to provide a solution to the situation for everyone in the 
home); 
(4) the problem that the category of persons occupying land as their home is 
uncertain in scope; 
(5) the "where will it all end" argument. 
64
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The first two justifications can be quickly rejected: the E C H R is designed to give 
practical protection of rights. It would fail in this if it allowed precedent or an historic 
definition of a tort to intrude. In any event there is nothing to prevent the creation of 
a new tort. Finally neither justification involves pursuit of a legitimate aim. 
The third argument does have a legitimate aim (of protecting economic well being) 
given that economic benefit can flow from keeping the law as it is because it assists the 
making of informal arrangements. However, it hardly seems that it meets a pressing 
social need or is proportionate, if the law were changed arrangements would probably 
be made almost as often and could be further encouraged by the court imposing cost 
sanctions for unreasonable failure properly to attempt to make such an agreement 
before resorting to legal action.71 
The fourth justification, that a change in the law would create conceptual uncertainty 
is also, it is suggested, without foundation, given that the category of "persons who 
occupy land as their (rightful) home" is not particularly uncertain and could soon be 
demarcated by case law. In any case, a degree of uncertainty o f scope is inherent in the 
human rights field and is hardly a justification for not protecting such individuals either 
in general or in the context of Article 8(2). 
The fifth justification, concerning the dangers of expanding the law too far is also, 
it is suggested, without foundation. Home life has a special significance under Article 
8 and there is nothing in Article 8 that would require private nuisance to expand to 
interests outside the home: even those of a special kind of which John Wightman has 
written.72 
Article 14 (In Conjunction With Article 8). 
If the E C t H R were to hold that Article 8 had been violated, it would not proceed to 
consider Article 14. Nonetheless Article 14 is worth considering, by way of subsidiary 
argument and as an issue of some academic interest. 
Article 14 prohibits discrimination, stating: 
[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status. 
In the context of Article 8, this means that "once a state has taken a positive step 
to promote or protect private or family life, it must, in principle extend the benefits to 
all without discrimination."73 Although Article 14 does mention discrimination on any 
ground it must be admitted that the only direct discrimination likely to arise in the 
scenario under discussion would be on the basis of whether or not one has rights over 
land. However, discrimination on this basis in turn indirectly disadvantages certain 
groups of people, particularly children (who cannot acquire rights over land) and 
women (who may be less likely to have them). 
The question of violation of Article 14 was considered in Spadea and Scalabrino v. 
Italy where it was stated: 
Article 14 will be breached where, without objective and reasonable justification persons 
in "relevantly" similar situations are treated differently. For a claim of violation of this 
71
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Article to succeed, it has therefore to be established, inter alia, that the situation of the 
alleged victim can be considered similar to that of persons who have been better treated.74 
For the purposes of compensation for diminution of market value the person who 
lives in a home with rights over the land is not in a "relevantly" similar position to the 
person who lives in a home without such rights. However, he or she is in a relevantly 
similar position for the purposes of enjoying his or her home life in other respects. As 
such the discriminatory state of English law will breach Article 14 unless an objective 
and reasonable justification can be found for it. 
As set out above, a justification would be objective and reasonable if it involved the 
pursuit of a legitimate aim with the value of achieving this aim being in proportion to 
the restriction on the rights in question. On a few occasions a state has been able to 
find a sufficient justification for discrimination. For example, in Petrovic v. Austria15 
the complaint was that paternity leave payments were not provided when maternity 
leave payments were. However, it is difficult to see any of the five justifications put 
forward in Hunter constituting an objective and reasonable justification for the 
purposes of Article 14. Even where they pursue a legitimate aim that aim is not 
sufficiently important to be proportionate to the restriction on rights that they involve. 
Indeed, one might almost go as far as Professor Fleming who describes the 
discrimination at the heart o f the orthodox position as "senseless."76 
Article 1 Of Protocol 1 
Article 1 of Protocol 1, which guarantees the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions, is not relevant here as "it is mainly concerned with the arbitrary 
confiscation of property and does not, in principle, guarantee a right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions in a pleasant environment."77 
Article 6 
In spite of Osman v. UK,7S it seems unlikely after the E C t H R decision in Z and Others 
v. UK 79 that striking out an action because it does not amount to an established cause 
of action will be treated as denying the right to a fair trial.80 
Article 13 In Conjunction With Article 8 (Or 14). 
Article 13 reads 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have 
an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
In Hat ton and Others v. UK, it was stated that Article 13 had been consistently 
interpreted by the E C t H R as requiring a remedy in domestic law only in respect of 
grievances which could be regarded as "arguable" in terms of the Convention. In the 
case itself since a violation of Article 8 was found, Article 13 had to be considered.81 
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The applicant had not been able to take a private nuisance action under domestic law 
because this had been barred by the Civil Aviation Act 1982, section 76(1) which 
provides, so far as is relevant, that: 
No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance, by reason only of the 
flight of an aircraft over any property at a height above the ground which, having regard 
to wind, weather and all the circumstances of the case, is reasonable, or the ordinary 
incidents of such flight, so long as the provisions of any Air Navigation Order . . . have 
been duly complied with . . . . 
The only means of legal challenge that remained to the applicants was judicial review 
of the government's 1993 scheme for restrictions on noise from night flights. However, 
the E C t H R stated that it was clear that the scope of review by the domestic courts was 
limited to the classic English public law concepts, such as irrationality, unlawfulness 
and patent unreasonableness. This did not allow consideration whether the increase in 
night flights under the 1993 scheme represented a justifiable limitation on the right to 
respect for the private and family life and home of those living in the vicinity of 
Heathrow airport.82 As a consequence the scope of action available to the applicants 
was not enough to enable the U K state to comply with Article 13. 
It is worth noting that Hatton was heard in the E C t H R after the introduction of the 
H R A - illustrating that its implementation was no guarantee against continued 
violations of Article 13. 
Violations of Article 13 after the coming into force of the HRA 
The first basis on which the E C t H R might still find a violation of Article 13 is that a 
domestic court or tribunal might, in a particular case, have failed to provide a remedy 
simply because it had wrongly concluded that there was no violation of a substantive 
E C H R right. This is bound to happen on occasion despite the fact that under the 
H R A , section 2, the judiciary "must" take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence in 
"determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right."83 
The second basis on which it is still possible for a violation of Article 13 to be found 
is that, where legislation is at issue, the domestic courts and tribunals are not always 
empowered to take any action in respect of the violation of an applicant's E C H R right 
except to notify Parliament of the violation, i.e. issue a declaration of incompatibility.84 
This is of some relevance to the scenario under discussion because, as Hatton 
illustrates, the availability of a private nuisance action is not always governed purely 
by the common law. 
The circumstances in which the domestic courts and tribunals can only issue a 
declaration of incompatibility are governed by the scope of the H R A , section 3. Section 
3(1) contains the "interpretative obligation" that in "so far as it is possible to do so, 
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way 
which is compatible with the Convention rights." This applies to all legislation passed 
82
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before or after the H R A came into force. Most incompatible legislative provisions will 
remain because section 3(1) clearly does not allow judges to challenge incompatible 
legislation unless the legislation is subordinate and then only if primary legislation does 
not prevent removal of the incompatibility.85 Nonetheless, in the recent House of Lords 
decision R v. A (Complainant's Sexual History)*6 Lord Steyn, using the White Paper 
that had introduced the Human Rights Bill as support,87 suggested that section 3 even 
applied if there were no ambiguity in the language of a legislative provision in the sense 
of its being capable of two different meanings.88 In explaining exactly how far the 
courts should go his Lordship indicated: 
In accordance with the will of Parliament as reflected in section 3 it will sometimes be 
necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained. The 
techniques to be used will not only involve the reading down of express language in a 
statute but also the implication of provisions. A declaration of incompatibility is a measure 
of last resort. It must be avoided unless it is plainly impossible to do so. If a clear 
limitation on Convention rights is stated in terms, such an impossibility will arise: R v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 132A-B per 
Lord Hoffmann.89 
The other judge to comment on the scope of section 3 in R v. A (Complainant's 
Sexual History) was Lord Hope who also saw it as giving judges the selective power 
to modify, alter or supplement legislative provisions. However, whilst Lord Steyn felt 
that this power merely did not extend to interpreting legislative provisions in a manner 
that conflicted with the express will of Parliament, Lord Hope felt that it also did not 
extend to interpreting legislative provisions in a manner that conflicted with the implied 
will of Parliament.90 Lord Hope's view may be preferable but until the difference of 
opinion is settled by a future House of Lords ' decision, we are in something of a 
"constitutional void".9 1 The relevance of the problem to the context of our scenario 
can be gauged by imagining Hatton had been heard by a domestic court. The court 
would only have been able to circumvent the fact that Civil Aviation Act 1982, section 
76(1) expressly denied the applicants the opportunity to gain redress for noise 
85
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disturbance in a nuisance action by creating a new tort. However, doing so would have 
subverted the implied purpose of the section, which was to provide a level of immunity 
for airports from civil action for noise disturbance. 
Another point to make about section 3 is that by virtue of section 6(2) it will act as 
a qualification on the section 6(1) legal duty on public authorities not "to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right." Accordingly a public authority will 
only be acting unlawfully if it does not act in a manner which is compatible with 
Convention rights when it was possible for it to do so. When legislation, even when 
filtered through section 3, prevents a public authority from acting compatibly with a 
Convention right, the only domestic recourse a claimant would have would be to seek 
a declaration of incompatibility. Again, an effective remedy for Article 13 purposes 
would have been denied. 
The third basis on which the domestic courts and tribunals may not provide an 
effective remedy for breach of a ECHR right is that the H R A confers on domestic 
courts a power, but not an obligation, to provide a remedy, let alone to provide an 
effective one for Article 13 purposes.92 
USING T H E H R A : A N ILLUSTRATION 
Obviously if the defendant is not a public authority the claimant must make his or her 
case on the basis of pre-existing law. However, if the defendant is a public authority 
the claimant has standing under the H R A , section 7 to argue his or her case on the 
basis of section 6. Peter Marcic v. Thames Water Utilities Limited 93 is a highly relevant 
illustration. Mr Marcic had, on several occasions over a number of years, suffered the 
discharge into his front garden (and from there into his back garden) of surface and 
foul water discharged from sewers operated by Thames Water. He had taken successful 
steps to prevent its getting into his home but it had damaged the fabric of his house. 
Judge Havery Q.C.in the Technology and Construction Court dismissed the claims 
founded on Rylands v. Fletcher, nuisance; negligence and breach of statutory duty. 
However, the judge allowed the claim of Mr Marcic under the H R A , section 7 that he 
had been the victim of an unlawful act by a public authority. Specifically, his claim was 
that Thames Water had acted unlawfully under section 6 of the H R A as a public 
authority which had acted in a manner incompatible with Mr Marcic's right to respect 
for his home under Article 8 of the ECHR and of his entitlement to peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions under Article 1 of the First Protocol, by failing to carry out works 
to bring the repeated flooding of Mr Marcic's property to an end. Using Guerra v. 
Italy94 as authority, it was emphasised that although the interference under Article 8(1) 
resulted not from active interference but from a failure to act, Thames Water could 
nonetheless be liable in principle, and was ultimately so in fact because it could not 
92
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justify its interference under Article 8(2).95 Damages were awarded under the power in 
section 8. Both parties appealed. Thames Water challenged the finding under section 
7. Mr Marcic challenged the remainder of the decision. He was not satisfied by merely 
having succeeded under the ECHR as this left him without damages for that portion 
of the harm he had suffered prior to the implementation of the H R A . The Court of 
Appeal agreed with the decision of the Technology and Construction Court that 
Thames Water had acted in a manner incompatible with Mr Marcic's ECHR rights. 
However, in the view of the Court of Appeal, reliance on section 7 and the H R A as 
a whole was superfluous in Mr Marcic's case in as much as he could clearly bring his 
case within the pre-existing scope of private nuisance. This in turn enabled him to 
obtain damages for all the harm he had suffered, not just that suffered after the H R A 
came into force. 
METHODS FOR E X P A N D I N G DOMESTIC PROTECTION OF H O M E LIFE 
Assuming that in our scenario, where the applicant does not have proprietary rights in 
land, judges would have to expand domestic law to make it compatible with Article 8 
and possibly with Article 14 (in conjunction with Article 8) what approach should they 
take? In Douglas v. Hello Ltd., Keene L.J. said that 
since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts as a public authority 
cannot act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right: section 6(1). That 
arguably includes their activity in interpreting and developing the common law, even where 
no public authority is a party to the litigation. Whether this extends to creating a new 
cause of action between private persons and bodies is more controversial, since to do so 
would circumvent the restrictions contained on proceedings contained in section 7(1) of the 
Act and on remedies in section 8(1).96 
This quotation provides a summary of the debate concerning any direct horizontal 
effects of the H R A i.e. whether it provides new causes of action between private 
parties. This was an issue that Keene L.J. said was unnecessary to determine in the 
proceedings with which he was faced since reliance was being placed on "breach of 
confidence, an established cause of action, the scope of which may now need to be 
approached in the light of an obligation on this court under section 6(1) of the Act."97 
Since Douglas, the courts have continued to see the breach of confidence action as 
a suitable method of ensuring that legal protection from disclosure of private matters 
is compatible with Article 8 in cases like Theakston v. MGN Limited9* and most 
recently A v. B & Anor, sub nom Garry Flitcroft v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd." 
Rightly or wrongly, the judges have viewed the development of the tort of breach of 
confidence as merely an evolution. How they would address those areas where the only 
way an existing cause of action can be rendered compatible with an ECHR right is if 
its fundamental nature is changed remains moot. In the home life context, this dilemma 
may affect trespass to land as well as private nuisance (and probably by extension, the 
95
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rule in Rylands v. Fletcher). Currently trespass to land protects possession of land from 
physical invasion.100 However, it could be extended by the courts in the light of Article 
8 additionally to protect the private physical space of legitimate users of land who do 
not have possession such as the lodger or hotel guest.101 
In essence the question is whether a property-based claim should become something 
more. This recently arose as a matter for consideration in the High Court in Nora 
McKenna and Others v. British Aluminium Limited.102 This case involved the defendant 
bringing an action to strike out claims in private nuisance and strict liability as having 
no prospect of success under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.103 The defendant was 
relying on the House of Lords' decision in Hunter in support of an argument that the 
claims of those claimants who had no rights over the land "affected" should be struck 
out. Giving judgment, Neuberger J. stated that these claims could not be struck out 
because it was at least questionable whether the Hunter approach was compatible with 
Article 8. If, or when, the case goes to trial we will be enlightened by a definitive 
answer to this question. However, in the meantime it is worth pointing out that 
Neuberger J. clearly saw the question of appropriate action to be taken should the 
approach in Hunter be incompatible with Article 8 as less than straightforward. The 
defendant had argued that the section 6 duty owed by courts and tribunals should not 
extend to changing the common law in such a fashion that a property-based claim was 
altered into something else.104 Neuberger J. did not need to decide whether this 
argument was correct but admitted it was a "powerful" one that "may very well turn 
out to be right."105 
However, the problem is that if this argument does turn out to be correct then, 
unless the defendant is a public authority, the courts and tribunals will arguably be 
"forced" to find another way of complying with their section 6 duty. This will 
necessitate evolving a new cause of action out of existing law; something they will have 
to do in any event in situations where there is a breach of a claimant's ECHR right(s) 
but no relevant existing cause of action. On the question of creating a new cause of 
action the Lord Chancellor stated in the House of Lords debates on the Human Rights 
Bill that in his opinion: 
. . . the court is not obliged to remedy the failure by legislating via the common law either 
where a convention right is infringed by incompatible legislation or where, because of the 
absence of legislation - say, privacy legislation - a convention right is unprotected. In my 
view, the courts may not act as legislators and grant new remedies for infringement of 
convention rights unless the common law itself enables them to develop new rights or 
remedies.*06 [italics added] 
The italicized sections of this statement indicate that the Lord Chancellor clearly 
thought that the evolution of new causes of action was a normal part of the function 
of the common law. This would suggest that in the scenario under discussion the courts 
could quite easily develop a new tort. The statement of case in Nora McKenna and 
100
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Others suggested "a common law tort analogous to nuisance"107 which might be taken 
as a rather vague plea for a tort protecting the use and enjoyment of home life from 
indirect interference. The alternative would be to evolve an all-embracing tort of 
privacy. O n the question of the latter choice the Lord Chancellor rather equivocally 
commented: 
I believe that the true view is that the courts will be able to adapt and develop the common 
law by relying on existing domestic principles in the laws of trespass, nuisance, copyright, 
confidence and the like, to fashion a common law right of privacy.108 [italics added] 
D i d he mean that a right of privacy would in effect exist because a patchwork of 
expanded existing causes of action would cover the whole area of privacy? Or did he 
mean that the courts would soon put these separate causes of action under an umbrella 
cause of action called privacy? It seems that he thought the latter was at least possible. 
Indeed, in an earlier statement he went as far as suggesting that irrespective of whether 
the Human Rights Bil l was passed the judiciary were "pen poised" to "develop a right 
of privacy".109 This comment of His Lordship is particularly surprising as for a over 
a century and a half the legal world has been waiting for an action in privacy to arise 
from the foundations built in cases such as Prince Albert v. Strange.110 In the meantime 
we have witnessed the failure of cases such as Kaye v. Robertson111 (which involved the 
Alio! Alio! star Gorden Kaye), because of the inadequate coverage of piecemeal causes 
of action.112 We have also experienced the irony of English authorities being 
instrumental in development in the US courts of a right of privacy.113 The intellectual 
pioneers of the U S approach, Warren and Brandeis, commented: 
[t]he principle which protects personal writings and any other productions of the intellect 
or of the emotions, is the right of privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate 
when it extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts and to personal 
relations, domestic or otherwise.114 
O f course a problem with an all-embracing tort of privacy is that it would be like 
a vast ocean with uncertain boundaries. One can understand this having been a 
disincentive to its creation in English law. However, following implementation of the 
H R A it is difficult to see the force of this argument: the ability to argue "the right to 
privacy" has created uncertainty as to the nature and scope of the law in certain areas 
in any event. Furthermore, turning this "right" into a tort in the common law sense 
of the word would be the best way of diminishing any such uncertainty because instead 
of simply making decisions on the privacy issue at hand judges would be making 
broader pronouncements on the scope of a privacy law as a whole. It would also make 
drafting particulars of claim much easier: avoiding the danger of claims failing because 
lawyers have not identified the right cause of action from the existing piecemeal 
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 Kaye's representatives sought to get an interlocutory injunction preventing publication of an article in the Sunday Sport 
that claimed he had agreed to give the paper an exclusive interview. In fact he had been in his private hospital room 
recovering from extensive injuries to his head and brain and there were notices saying the media should not be there. 
In spite of this a newspaper reporter and photographer had invaded his private hospital room, trying to get an interview 
with him when he was in no fit condition and had taken a photograph of him. His representatives argued libel, malicious 
falsehood, trespass to the person and passing off before the Court of Appeal (Glidewell, Bingham and Leggat LJJ.) but 
only malicious falsehood succeeded and this was only to the limited extent that it prevented publication of the falsehood 
that he had agreed to give an exclusive interview. 
113
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multitude."5 Doubtless there would be teething problems but this could be to the 
benefit of all in identifying the precise nature of applicants' rights and obligations in 
the privacy context. Of course it must be admitted that it is more likely that domestic 
judges will continue with a piecemeal approach of expanding existing causes of action 
wherever required and creating new piecemeal causes of action wherever unavoidably 
necessary. However, after a period of such development we would probably have what 
was the equivalent of a tort of privacy in any case, at which point the judges might 
be prepared to concede that there was indeed a tort of privacy, both to avoid a charade 
and to make it easier to set out one's particulars of claim. 
1,5
 This could have been the problem in Kaye in as much as the actor's representatives might well have had better luck 
if they had argued breach of confidence. If the situation arose today and the tort of privacy could not be argued they 
might make the argument identified earlier that their "space privacy" and legitimate users of private space should be 
protected by trespass to land as seen in the light of Article 8 or alternatively a new tort analogous to trespass to land. 
